The Seventh Kashmiri Pandit Exodus (1989–1990)

Historical Context

The late 1980s marked the onset of a full-scale insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, driven by Islamist militant groups like the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and Hizbul Mujahideen, seeking either independence or merger with Pakistan. Fueled by grievances over the rigged 1987 state elections, regional instability, and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) support, the insurgency targeted Kashmiri Pandits, perceived as pro-India due to their historical administrative roles and Hindu identity. The period saw escalating violence, culminating in the mass exodus of Pandits from the Kashmir Valley in 1989–1990, driven by targeted killings, threats, and state failure to provide security.

Forms of Oppression

Targeted Killings and Violence

  • Assassinations: Militants strategically killed prominent Pandits to instill fear:
    • September 14, 1989: Tika Lal Taploo, a BJP leader, was shot dead by JKLF militants in Srinagar.
    • November 4, 1989: Neelkanth Ganjoo, a retired judge who sentenced JKLF co-founder Maqbool Bhat, was killed near the Srinagar High Court.
    • December 27, 1989: Journalist-lawyer Prem Nath Bhat was murdered in Anantnag.
  • Scale of Deaths: Estimates vary, with the Kashmiri Pandit Sangharsh Samiti (KPSS) reporting 399 Pandit deaths from 1990–2011 (75% in the first year), the Jammu and Kashmir government noting 219 Pandit deaths (1989–2004), and Indian Home Ministry data citing 217 Hindu civilian fatalities (1988–1991). Sanjay Tickoo estimates 650 deaths over two decades, rejecting claims of thousands as exaggerated.
  • Broader Violence: Militants attacked Pandit homes, with reports of looting, arson, and occasional mass violence in early 1990. Gendered violence, such as the alleged rape and murder of Girija Tickoo, though rare, amplified fears of sexual violence.

Psychological Intimidation and Threats

  • Threatening Notices: In January 1990, Urdu newspapers like Aftab published Hizbul Mujahideen press releases ordering Pandits to leave or face harm. Posters on Srinagar walls demanded adherence to Islamic rules and threatened Hindus.
  • Mosque Loudspeakers: Anti-Hindu slogans, including “Asi gachchi Pakistan, Batao roas te Batanev san” (we want Pakistan with Hindu women, not their men) and “Raliv, Tsaliv, ya Galiv” (convert, leave, or die), were broadcast from mosques, particularly on January 19, 1990, creating a “night-long hysteric macabre,” as described by Pandits.
  • Personal Threats: Individuals like Sanjay Tickoo received posters on their homes demanding departure or death. Though letters were sparingly distributed, rumors amplified panic, exploiting the Pandits’ minority status.

Destruction of Property and Religious Sites

  • Property Damage: Pandit homes and businesses were looted, burned, or occupied post-exodus, as reported by Amnesty International (1993). Abandoned properties were often sold at throwaway prices.
  • Temple Desecration: Temples were vandalized or destroyed, echoing historical exoduses like that under Sikandar Butshikan (1389–1413). While some claims of widespread temple destruction are debated, the loss of religious sites deepened cultural alienation.

Social Ostracism and Communal Tensions

  • Strained Relations: The insurgency disrupted Kashmir’s syncretic Kashmiriyat tradition, with some Pandits reporting hostile attitudes from Muslim neighbors, such as whispered slogans. The lack of collective Muslim action to protect Pandits, often due to fear of militant reprisals, fostered feelings of betrayal.
  • Isolation: Public calls for jihad and anti-India sentiment isolated Pandits, who felt abandoned by both their community and the state.

Economic Disruption

  • Loss of Livelihoods: As landowners and professionals, Pandits lost homes, businesses, and agricultural assets, with many properties looted or sold under duress. This economic devastation compounded resettlement challenges in unfamiliar regions like Jammu and Delhi.

State Failure and Alleged Complicity

  • Lack of Protection: The Indian government (Janata Dal-led) and Jammu and Kashmir administration under Governor Jagmohan (appointed January 19, 1990) failed to control militancy, leaving Pandits vulnerable. The absence of security guarantees was a key driver of the exodus.
  • Capitulation to Militants: The December 1989 release of five JKLF militants to secure Rubaiya Sayeed’s release signaled state weakness, emboldening insurgents.
  • Controversial Claims: Some Kashmiri Muslims, as noted by Wajahat Habibullah, allege Jagmohan encouraged Pandit migration to communalize the conflict and justify military crackdowns, though primary sources lack corroboration. Those who stayed, like Sanjay Tickoo, faced official apathy and limited support.

Perpetrators

  • Militant Groups: JKLF, Hizbul Mujahideen, and other Pakistan-backed groups led the violence. JKLF’s initial secular independence rhetoric shifted toward Islamist goals, targeting Pandits as symbols of Indian authority.
  • Local Collaborators: Some local Muslims aided militants, though many were also victims of the insurgency’s violence. The extent of community complicity is contentious, with scholars noting limited widespread support for anti-Pandit actions.
  • External Support: Pakistan’s ISI provided training, weapons, and funding, escalating the insurgency’s intensity and targeting of Pandits, as confirmed by historical analyses.

Flight and Conversion

  • Mass Exodus: Of an estimated 120,000–140,000 Pandits in the Valley, 90,000–100,000 fled between February and March 1990, primarily to Jammu, Delhi, and other Indian cities. Higher estimates of 300,000–800,000 include later migrations. By 2011, only 2,700–3,400 Pandits remained in the Valley.
  • No Widespread Conversion: Unlike earlier exoduses, forced conversion was rare, as the primary goal was ethnic cleansing to homogenize the Valley’s population for the insurgency’s aims.
  • Refugee Camps: Fleeing Pandits settled in squalid Jammu camps, enduring cramped 10×10-foot tenements, heat strokes, snake bites, and inadequate rations. Many faced poverty, depression, and cultural dislocation, with rural Pandits particularly affected.

Scale and Impact

  • Demographic Collapse: The Pandit population dropped from ~140,000 to under 20,000 by 1998, and to 2,700–3,400 by 2011, reducing their presence from 5–7% to 0.01% of the Valley’s population. Over 60,000 migrant families were registered.
  • Cultural and Economic Loss: The exodus severed Pandits from their ancestral homes, temples, and livelihoods, eroding their cultural identity. Properties were looted or sold cheaply, and the community struggled to preserve traditions in exile.
  • Intergenerational Trauma: Memoirs like Siddhartha Gigoo’s A Long Season of Ashes highlight the enduring psychological scars, with displaced Pandits facing identity loss and alienation in refugee camps.

Contested Narratives and Terminology

  • Pandit Perspective: Many Pandits view the exodus as ethnic cleansing or genocide, driven by Pakistan-backed militants and tacitly supported by some Kashmiri Muslims. Organizations like Panun Kashmir demand a separate homeland, citing the slogan “Raliv, Tsaliv, ya Galiv” and lack of justice (only 215 FIRs filed, with no major convictions).
  • Kashmiri Muslim Perspective: Some argue the Indian state, particularly Governor Jagmohan, encouraged Pandit migration to portray the insurgency as communal, justifying repression. They note that Muslims also suffered violence and did not universally support anti-Pandit actions.
  • Scholarly View: Scholars like Mona Bhan argue the exodus stemmed from a broader political uprising against Indian state mismanagement, not solely communal hatred. Terms like “genocide” or “ethnic cleansing,” used by Hindu nationalist groups and the 1995 National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), are contested as inflammatory, given the relatively low death toll. The BJP and films like The Kashmir Files have been criticized for exaggerating violence (e.g., misattributing later massacres like Nadimarg 2003 to 1990).

Aftermath and Ongoing Challenges

  • Displacement Crisis: By 2010, only 808 Pandit families (3,445 people) remained in the Valley. Most resettled in Jammu or urban India, living in camps or struggling to integrate. The Indian government registered over 60,000 migrant families, but rehabilitation efforts faltered.
  • Failed Rehabilitation: By 2015, only one Pandit family returned to the Valley despite incentives. Proposals for exclusive Pandit settlements faced resistance from Kashmiri Muslims fearing segregation and from Pandits citing security risks. The 2019 revocation of Article 370 aimed to facilitate returns but saw limited success, with ongoing killings deterring resettlement.
  • Lack of Justice: No independent investigations have been conducted, and 215 FIRs remain unresolved due to judicial delays. The Supreme Court’s refusal to probe, citing time lapses, has denied survivors justice. International advocacy, like the UK Parliament’s 2025 “genocide” motion, highlights the issue but lacks tangible outcomes.
  • Impact on Kashmir: The exodus weakened Kashmiriyat, polarizing Hindu-Muslim relations. The Indian state’s increased militarization, partly justified by the Pandit plight, intensified Muslim grievances, complicating reconciliation.

Critical Analysis

The 1989–1990 exodus resulted from a mix of militant violence, psychological terror, state failure, and communal mistrust, amplified by Pakistan’s ISI and India’s political missteps. The low death toll (217–650) relative to displacement (90,000–190,000) underscores fear and insecurity as primary drivers. Hindu nationalist exaggerations of thousands killed or widespread sexual violence, debunked by scholars and Pandit leaders like Tickoo, oversimplify a complex political uprising rooted in Indian state failures, such as the 1987 election rigging. Conversely, claims of a state-orchestrated evacuation lack evidence and dismiss documented violence. The Pandit suffering was undeniable, but so was the broader Kashmiri struggle, with Muslims also facing insurgency-related violence.

Conclusion

The Seventh Kashmiri Pandit Exodus was a devastating human rights crisis driven by targeted killings, threats, property destruction, and state inaction amid a militant insurgency. Between 90,000–190,000 Pandits fled the Valley, leaving behind a shattered community and cultural heritage. The exodus, often framed as ethnic cleansing, reflects a broader political conflict exacerbated by external and internal failures. Despite calls for justice and rehabilitation, the Pandit diaspora remains displaced, with reconciliation hindered by polarized narratives. Addressing their trauma alongside Kashmiri Muslim grievances is essential for healing and restoring Kashmir’s pluralistic identity.